Previous studies of intergenerational income mobility have not considered potential birthorder or family-size effects in the estimated income elasticity. This paper uses a large sample of individuals born between 1962 and 1964; income elasticities with respect to the father's income are estimated for individuals in different birth-order positions for a given family size. This paper presents results based on labor income and total income for sons and daughters separately. The elasticity tends to decrease with birth order for a given family size, especially in the labor-income analysis of fathers and sons. Family size, on the other hand, does not seem to have a large impact on the intergenerational income elasticity.
Introduction
Rising interest in intergenerational income mobility has generated many studies of the relation between the long-run income of parents and children. 1 The interest in the transmission of economic status from one generation to another is generally motivated by a wish to determine the degree of equality of opportunity. The extensive Swedish welfare system is usually interpreted as a decision to promote equal opportunities: for instance, most schools are public and higher education is free of charge to reduce the importance of family background. In this way, studies that examine the intergenerational income mobility can be useful as equality barometers in society.
The empirical studies in this area have not yet considered potential birth-order or familysize effects in the income relation of parents and children. Children's similarities to their parents and their tendencies to approach a similar income level may, to some degree, depend on whether or not they are the only child in the household. The presence of several siblings reduces the time that the parents are able to devote to each child. The unique position in the birth order of each child may also have an impact on this process. For example, first-born children grow up in more adult-oriented environments than later-born children. Earlier studies of intergenerational income mobility only provide average income elasticities over individuals from all categories of birth-order positions and family sizes. The focus in this study is to find out whether or not income elasticities for individuals with different birthorder positions and family sizes deviate from the average income elasticity. More specifically, the first part of the analysis provides conventionally estimated average income elasticities with respect to the father's income for both sons and daughters. The second part of the analysis allows for birth-order and family-size differences in the estimated elasticities.
Potential differences are evaluated at the end. Throughout the paper, family size refers to the number of full siblings in the family.
The average income elasticity in Sweden for fathers and sons is estimated to be 0.28 (Björklund and Jäntti 1997) , 0.24 (Björklund and Chadwick 2002) , and 0.13 (Österberg 2000) . It is about 0.10 for fathers and daughters (Österberg 2000) . In the US, the elasticity for fathers and sons is about 0.40, while the estimates for fathers and daughters are about the same (Solon 1992 , Zimmerman 1992 , Chadwick and Solon 2002 . Still, there is little knowledge about what drives the intergenerational transmission of income. For instance, to the extent that a parent's income has an impact on the future income of the children, is the impact equivalent for all children in a household? Allowing for birth-order and family-size differences is one way to learn more about the mechanisms behind the transmission of economic status between generations.
The next section discusses why to expect birth-order and family-size effects in an intergenerational context; section 3 provides a short overview of the existing literature on birth-order and family-size effects on the level of earnings and educational attainment.
Section 4 presents the econometric framework for estimating average income elasticities and income elasticities by birth order and family size. Section 5 describes the data and the sample selection, section 6 presents the empirical results and section 7 concludes the paper.
Why to expect birth-order and family-size effects
Earlier research offers several suggestions why birth order may affect an individual's future outcome. Ejrnaes and Pörtner (2002) divide them in four categories: constraints, householdenvironment, cultural and biological factors. Most of these categories are also relevant for the discussion of family size.
Financial constraints and imperfect capital markets may reduce opportunities to equalize expenditures on children and therefore opportunities for children may vary, depending on the birth-order position. Further, when the first child is born, many parents are at the start of their careers, while later-born children may arrive when the parents are closer to the peak of their careers and earnings profile, especially if there are several children in the household (Behrman and Taubman 1986) . This may favor later-born children compared with earlierborn children, even though the impact on intergenerational income elasticity for siblings of different birth order is unclear.
From a constraints perspective, it may be that high-income earners have fewer children on average and more resources to spend on each child, compared to low-income earners.
Studies have shown that the highest income elasticities between generations are estimated at the top of the parents' income distribution in Sweden (Österberg 2000) . This would predict a negative relation between the number of siblings and income elasticity.
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The household-environment explanation suggests that the specific number of siblings and ages of siblings affect the environment in which the children grow up. Initially, firstborn children spend more time alone with their parents, because there are no other siblings with whom to compete for parents' attention. It has been argued that last-born children may also have this advantage (Hanushek 1992) . This is a reasonable argument if there is a large age difference between the second-to-last and the last-born child.
Parental separation is another aspect connected to the household-environment explanation. Separation from the father-which is still the most common outcome-may decrease the father's influence on the children. Because of this, lower income elasticity between children and absent fathers may be expected. Beyond this general effect, separations may also generate birth-order differences in the income elasticity, especially if there are large age differences between the siblings. Later-born siblings are younger at the time of the separation, so they have a shorter experience of living in the same household as their father, compared with older siblings. Therefore, a weaker income relation between the father and the later-born siblings may be expected. This will be referred to as a separation hypothesis. Sulloway (1997) , a leading debater about the significance of birth order, argues that firstborn children are more likely to identify with authority than their younger siblings. Clausen (1966) discusses the tendency of parents to delegate parts of their authority over younger children to the first-born child. He suggests that first-born children tend to recognize and accept parental authority more than later-born children. It has also been argued that since first-born children grow up in an adult-oriented environment, they tend to imitate their parents more than their younger siblings (Behrman and Taubman 1986) . 3 A related discussion concerns role models and the idea that younger siblings might consider older siblings as role models and identify with them, which reduces the relative influence from the parents.
Differences in the family environment that depend on family size may occur because parents with several children have less time to devote to each child. The observation that economic and social family resources become diluted as the family grows is described as a 2 However, such a finding would, at least to some degree, depend on the model being incorrectly specified and including a quadratic income term may yield a different result.
trade-off between "child quantity and child quality" (Blake, 1981; 1989) . Hanushek (1992) develops a family maximization model based on a theory presented by Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973) . It distinguishes between public time, which the family spends together, and private time, which a child spends alone with one or two parents. Naturally, the amount of public time does not necessarily decrease with the number of children in the family, unless the parents must work more to support a larger family, while the amount of private time is likely to do so. One hypothesis is that there is less parental influence on children in large families, which may generate weaker income relations. The intergenerational income elasticity would then again be expected to decrease with family size; accordingly, children without siblings would be expected to exhibit the largest income elasticity.
Finally, birth-order effects may also be due to cultural factors. For example, there is an old tradition that the eldest son inherits the farm. This agricultural habit is also common when private companies are inherited within a family. If this tradition still exists, it may be reasonable to predict higher income elasticity among first-born children.
Previous research on birth-order and family-size effects
Previous studies of birth order and family size have exclusively focused on the effects on wage level, education level, and schooling performance. Lindert (1977) finds a negative relation in US data between family size and the expected years of schooling. He also finds significant sibling position effects on schooling performance. The results indicate that in large families, first-born children have an advantage over middle-born children. Using US data, Behrman and Taubman (1986) find negative effects of family size on years of schooling. They also find differences by birth order in the effects on years of schooling.
First-born children receive more schooling, and the effects remain when controlling for family size. The birth-order differences on the effect on earnings, on the other hand, become insignificant when controlling for family size. Kessler (1991) finds neither significant birthorder nor childhood family-size effects on the level or growth of wages in US data.
Hanushek (1992) finds positive effects on schooling performance in US data by being the first-born, but this effect is found to be entirely explained by the first-born's higher probability of belonging to small families. The study confirms earlier findings that schooling achievement decreases with a larger family size. Björklund and Jäntti (1998) find that children from large families in Sweden, Finland, and the US can expect to earn less than children from small families. Finally, Raaum and Aabo (2001) find that first-born children obtain more education than their siblings. Overall, these findings indicate the importance of integrating the birth-order analysis with the family-size analysis to avoid confounding birthorder effects with family-size effects.
Empirical framework

Estimating intergenerational income elasticity
A traditional model of the relation between the income of parents and children is shown in
where Y ci is the long-run log income of child c in family i, Y pi is the long-run log income of parent p in family i, and εi is a random component distributed as N(0,σ 2 ). β measures the elasticity of the childrens' income with respect to the parents' income. Consequently, (1-β ) refers to the degree of income mobility. If the childrens' income has the same variance as the parents' income, β also equals the intergenerational correlation. If the variances differ, correlations can be obtained by multiplying the elasticity coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviations of the parents' and the childrens' incomes.
The income measure of the model in equation 1-the long-run income-is not observed in the data. To approach the model in equation 1, income averages taken over several years are used because they produce a better measure of long-run income than single-year measures of income (Solon 1992) . A parent's income is usually measured later in the life cycle compared to the children, therefore intergenerational income mobility studies usually include age controls in the regressions to adjust for the life-cycle variation in income of both generations. In the present study, children are of similar age and therefore the age variables
for children are not included. Furthermore, parents are represented by the fathers in this study. Least squares is applied to the regression:
where Yci is the children's log income in 1999 and Y pi is the three-year average of the father's log incomes for 1970, 1975 and 1980 . Api is the father's average age during the income years and A ci 2 is the average of the father's squared age during those years.
Allowing for birth-order and family-size effects
A previous finding is that the intergenerational income elasticity tends to rise with the average age of the children in the sample (Reville 1995) . There is then an obvious risk in this type of analysis that age effects are mistaken for birth-order effects. One solution is to use individuals of similar age but who still have different birth-order positions and belong to families of different sizes.
To allow for birth-order and family-size effects, individuals of similar age are divided into sub-samples, depending on birth-order position and family size. Separate regressions are then run based on these samples: children without siblings; first-born children in two-child families; second-born children in two-child families; and so forth. In this way, the individual's birth order and family size can affect the estimation of intergenerational income elasticity.
Data and sample selection
The data used in this study are entirely based on administrative records kept by Statistics Sweden. They consist of a random sample that covers 20% of the population born in Sweden between 1962 and 1973, which amounts to about 250,000 individuals. In the data, full siblings, half siblings, and adopted children can be identified, but only full siblings are included in the analysis. Income data are gathered from registers based on employers' compulsory reports to the tax authorities and include the years 1990, 1993, 1996, and 1999 .
Some information about the individuals' parents, such as birth date and income, are 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 censuses. The income variables are annual labor income-including sickness benefits, parents' allowances, and income from farming activity-and total income, which includes annual labor income, pensions, unemployment benefits, capital income (including capital gains), and income from real estate property (inkomst av annan fastighet). (1970, 1975, and 1980) . One could argue that only fathers who have a positive income every year should be included. There is a trade-off between achieving a good measure of long-run income-which is promoted by including as many income observations per individual as possible-and avoiding that the sample is biased toward high-income earners. Including only those individuals who report positive income in all years produces a better measure of longrun income. But excluding those who have experienced unemployment would increase the sample's average income since more low-income earners become unemployed. This, in turn, might alter the estimated income elasticity because high-income earners tend to have higher income elasticity (Österberg 2000) . Over-sampling high-income earners might also alter the analysis of family-size effects because high-income earners tend to have fewer children.
Österberg (2000) presents results using both types of income restrictions. The restriction that requires a positive income every year produces slightly higher estimates of income elasticity for fathers and sons. The present study follows Österberg (2000) and uses both types of income restrictions, but to save some space, the appendix presents the results for the birth-order and family-size analysis where a positive income is required in every year.
The income restriction that requires positive average income results in 25,072 father and son pairs and 23,885 father and daughter pairs. 5 . Table 1 presents the averages of labor income for sons with a positive income in 1999.
For the complete sample, the average annual income in 1999 is SEK 256,000 (about EUR 24,000 ). Income averages, according to birth order and family size, indicate that the average income decreases with family size, and for a given family size it also decreases with birth order. The same pattern occurs for total income (see the appendix, which also includes income averages for daughters). Table 2 shows sample characteristics for fathers. In 1975, the average age of the fathers is 42, and their average annual income is SEK 232,000 which is slightly lower than the sons' average income. Österberg includes non-biological fathers in the sample, which might reduce the elasticity.
Empirical results
Average elasticities
Still, this difference needs further explanation.
The requirement of positive income in all years for the fathers produces a larger estimate for labor income and total income, which is also the finding in Österberg (2000) . Further, it is shown that the intergenerational income elasticity is stronger for labor income than for total income. For fathers and daughters, an income elasticity of 0.208 is estimated in the regression based on labor income where positive income is required for at least one year.
This estimate is considerably higher than in Österberg's study where the comparable 7 The measure of parental income in Björklund and Jäntti (1997) is a prediction of the fathers' log annual earnings based on his education and occupation. estimate is .076. As in the case of fathers and sons, the income relation is stronger for labor income than for total income. Table 4 presents regression coefficients from estimations of the intergenerational income elasticity by birth order and family size for both fathers and sons and fathers and daughters.
Elasticities by birth order and family size
Column one and row one show the estimate for sons/daughters without siblings; column one and row two show the estimate for first-born sons/daughters in two-child families; and so forth. 8 The overall tendency in the analysis of fathers and sons is that the elasticity decreases with birth order for a given family size, especially in large families. In three-child families, the estimate for first-born sons deviates largely from the estimates for middle-born and last-born sons: the former estimate is more than twice as large as the latter. The far-right column provides estimates for different family sizes regardless of birth order. The results indicate no large differences in the elasticity connected with family size. The estimates for fathers and daughters show a similar but weaker elasticity pattern compared to the analysis of fathers and sons. The finding that the elasticity does not vary much depending on family size also holds for fathers and daughters.
To test whether or not the estimates are significantly different from each other, the data are pooled and regressions, where birth-order and family-size variables are interacted with the fathers' income, are run. In the analysis of fathers and sons, the estimates are significantly different from each other in two-and three-child families, while the estimates in four-child families are not significantly different from each other. In the analysis of fathers and daughters, the estimates are only significantly different from each other in three-child families. In both analyses, the estimates for family size that disregard the effect of birth order are not significantly different from each other.
Regressions are also run where the fathers are required to have had a positive labor income in all income years. Table A4 in the appendix shows these results. The estimates are slightly higher compared to the estimates in table 4, and the difference in elasticity between first-borns and last-borns is about the same. Table 5 presents results based on total income for fathers and sons and fathers and daughters. Because total income also includes unemployment benefits, individuals who have experienced unemployment are included in this analysis. 9 The results show that the elasticity decreases with birth order for a given family size, but the decrease is smaller compared to the labor-income analysis. For sons of four-child families, the birth-order pattern has completely disappeared. For fathers and daughters, there is no pattern in the elasticity for individuals in different birth-order positions.
To summarize, a traditional analysis that measures the average elasticity of labor income (table 3) , shows an elasticity of 0.29 for fathers and sons and 0.21 for fathers and daughters.
Allowing for family-size effects does not greatly alter these results, but allowing for birthorder effects within each family size leads to estimates that decrease with birth order, especially in the labor income analysis. For fathers and sons, the estimates of first-born children are twice the size of those for last-born children in large families, and these estimates are significantly different from each other. The results for fathers and daughters are similar but weaker.
As mentioned in section 4.2, the intergenerational income elasticity tends to rise with the average age of the children in the sample. Thus it is not impossible that the elasticity varies with the age of the fathers, too. In the birth-order and family sixe analysis, the father's age Tables 1 and 2 show that the standard deviation of the income variable for sons is larger than for fathers. The income variable of the fathers is averaged over three years, which generally reduces the standard deviation. 10 To check if the results are sensitive to varying standard deviations, the intergenerational correlation is estimated based on standardized income data. 11 The results show that the correlation decreases with birth order for a given family size and the differences are significantly different from each other, in the same way as in the elasticity analysis. So the results are not sensitive to varying standard deviations. The results based on correlations are available upon request.
Testing hypotheses about the birth-order pattern
This section tries to understand why income elasticity tends to decrease with birth order for a given family size. The data allow some of the hypotheses discussed in section 2 to be tested. The separation hypothesis suggests that the tendency of income elasticity to decrease with birth order may be explained by the incidence of parental separations, because they are likely to affect the later-born children the most. In the case where the children are separated from the father, a weaker income relation between the father and the later-born children may be expected. Björklund and Chadwick (2002) Thus there is a stronger income relation in one-child families between fathers and sons who have lived together during the son's upbringing. In families with more than one child, this effect is not present. For sons in two-child families, there is no change in the elasticity for first-borns compared to the results in table 4, while the elasticity is smaller for last-borns.
The estimates for sons in three-child families show that first-borns have larger elasticity than before, while the elasticity of middle-born children is unchanged. The elasticity of last-born children has increased compared to the results in table 4; this result is weakly in line with the 11 Income measurement and specification are the same as in table 4.
assumptions of a separation hypothesis. In families with four or more children, the elasticity of last-born children is unchanged.
In the analysis of fathers and daughters, it is shown that daughters without siblings, who have grown up with their fathers, have a stronger income relation to their fathers. As in the analysis of fathers and sons, this effect is not present in families with more than one child.
The rest of the elasticities are more or less unchanged. To summarize, the results for sons from three-child families are weakly in line with a separation hypothesis, while the results for sons from other family sizes and for fathers and daughters are not. Therefore it is impossible to draw strong conclusions about a separation hypothesis.
Cultural factors suggest potential reasons why birth order would affect an individual's future outcome, for example, the old tradition that the eldest son inherits the farm or the family company. To the extent that this tradition continues, one may expect higher income elasticity among first-born children. 12 The results in this paper are to some extent in line with this prediction. Table 4 shows that the estimate for first-born sons from three-child families is much larger than the estimates for middle-born and last-born sons. One way to approach this problem is to find out if there is an abundance of first-born children among the selfemployed. Table 7 shows the fraction of self-employed children in different birth-order and family-size categories: there is no abundance of self-employed among first-born sons or daughters. Rather, the small differences indicate the opposite pattern. So the results are not in line with this hypothesis.
Conclusion
The main finding of this paper is that there seems to be patterns in the transmission of economic status between fathers and children. The income elasticity tends to decrease with birth order for a given family size, especially in the labor-income analysis of fathers and sons.
The present paper estimates an average 0.28 labor-income elasticity of fathers and sons. An analysis that allows for birth-order and family-size variation in the elasticity finds that the elasticity is up to 14 percentage points higher than the average elasticity for first-born children, and up to 12 percentage points lower than the average for last-born children in large families. Although family size does not seem to have a large impact on the intergenerational income elasticity.
The results on birth order are partly in line with one of the predicted birth-order effects that is suggested in section 2. The separation hypothesis predicts a weaker income relation between an absent father and later-born children; the results for sons from three-child families are weakly in line with this hypothesis. The results for sons from other family sizes and for fathers and daughters are not in line with a separation hypothesis.
There still remain birth-order differences in the results that need to be accounted for.
Perhaps psychological factors lead to these differences, such as the hypothesis that younger children regard older siblings as role models and are influenced by them rather than their fathers. This may generate weaker income relations between fathers and later-born children compared to first-borns or an only child.
Future research might investigate if the results in the paper can be replicated with other data sets and identify central mechanisms behind the dynamic process of income transmission between different family members. Note: The individuals in the samples are required to have positive income in 1999. The minimum value of 0 in the table indicates an income below SEK 500 and these values were rounded down to 0 (the income data are expressed in SEK 1000s). The share of an only child is smaller than the share in the Swedish population. This is due to the sampling procedure used by Statistics Sweden, which makes random draws based on individuals rather than households, leading to the over-representation of large families. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefits, parental allowances, and income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, and 1980 for fathers. A positive income for at least one year is required for fathers. Note: Standard errors in parentheses; sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log total income (annual labor income, pensions, unemployment benefits, capital income (including capital gains), and income from real estate property). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975, and 1980 for fathers. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Sample sizes in italics. The measure of income is log labor income (annual wages before taxes, sickness benefit, parental allowance, income from farming activity). Income is measured in 1999 for sons and daughters and in 1970, 1975 and 1980 for fathers.
